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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: CLOSING THE DOOR ON 
JUVENILE DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES 
Thomas Garrity+ 
It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the 
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.1 
- Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 
 
The precise moment when a person becomes an “adult” has been, is, and will 
likely continue to be a topic of heated debate in American society.  Oft-repeated 
talking points revolve around the proper age for those activities that society 
deems to be “adult” in nature: drinking, smoking, voting, driving, gun 
ownership, contracting—the list goes on ad infinitum.  In general, though, the 
United States Government, as well as the American people, assign a special 
weight to achieving the age of eighteen.  Eighteen is the age of enfranchisement, 
and, if male, the age at which one must sign up for the draft.  It is unlikely that 
the choosing of age eighteen as the turning point for “adulthood” is an 
endorsement by the government, or other institutions, of any theory that there is 
a special significance to arrival at that age.  Rather, out of sheer practicality, 
there must be a point at which a line is drawn.  The consensus, at least in the 
United States, places that line at age eighteen.2  But what effect does this concept 
have when merged into the context of American Constitutional law, particularly 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments? 
The Framers of the United States Constitution, out of a particular trepidation 
towards powerful national government, paid special attention to the protection 
of the people from unreasonable governmental intrusion or governmental 
restriction of individual liberty.3  Integral in this endeavor was the debate over 
                                                 
 + J.D., Magna Cum Laude, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2020; 
B.A., Magna Cum Laude, University of Pennsylvania, 2016.  I would like to thank Assistant United 
States Attorney Susan “Zeke” Knox for her invaluable expertise and help in drafting of this 
Comment.  I would also like to thank the editors and staff of the Catholic University Law Review 
for their review and preparation of this paper for publication. 
 1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 2. See Determining the Legal Age to Consent to Research, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN 
ST. LOUIS (July 26, 2012), https://hrpo.wustl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/5-Determining-
Legal-Age-to-Consent.pdf.  Note that the legal age of majority is also eighteen in the lion’s share 
of other countries listed within this document.  Id.  Additionally, those U.S. states and countries 
that do not place the age of majority at eighteen often place their chosen age of majority within one 
to two years of age eighteen.  Id. 
 3. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. 
L.J. 759, 785 (1994). 
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the bill of rights and the amendments contained therein.  For the purposes of this 
Comment, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution shall be the sole focus. 
The language of the Eighth Amendment is short and deceptively simple.  It 
reads: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”4  Narrowing in further, the final six 
words of the Amendment give rise to a litany of interpretive challenges.  
Foremost among them and bearing strongly on the issue studied in this 
Comment, is the methodology by which the ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments is bent and molded to accommodate the state imposition of 
“adulthood”—at least “adulthood” as a matter of law. 
A circuit split has arisen from recent Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. 
Simmons,5 Graham v. Florida,6 and Miller v. Alabama.7  These cases hold that 
capital punishment and life without parole (LWOP) are cruel and unusual as 
applied to juvenile nonhomicidal offenders categorically and as applied to 
juvenile homicidal offenders without consideration of youth as a mitigating 
factor.  The issue is that the Supreme Court has failed to provide guidance as to 
whether a de facto life sentence without parole—one in which the defendant is 
sentenced to “[a] term-of-years sentence without parole that meets or exceeds 
[his] life expectancy”—qualifies as cruel and unusual for Eighth Amendment 
purposes.8  Of the federal circuits that have addressed it, the majority have 
resolved this issue by stating that a de facto life sentence without parole is the 
functional equivalent of standard LWOP sentences, thereby invoking Graham 
and Miller and holding them unconstitutional.9  However, other courts have held 
that de facto LWOP stands as an exception to the categorical ban on LWOP for 
juveniles found in Graham and the presumption against such sentences found in 
Miller.10  Until the circuit split is resolved, the chance that a juvenile offender 
may be released before his life expectancy has run its course depends largely on 
where he was standing when the offense was committed. 
This circuit split has real-world implications, and with newly-appointed 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, the issue stands ripe for review.  Speaking at 
                                                 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 5. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 6. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 7. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 8. United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 9. See id. at 146 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile 
offenders that are not incorrigible.”); see also Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding that a sentence of 254 years and four months without parole eligibility until having 
completed a total of 127 years and two months is the functional equivalent of LWOP and is 
irreconcilable with Supreme Court precedent banning juvenile LWOP); Budder v. Addison, 851 
F.3d 1047, 1050, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that a 155 year sentence without parole until 
eighty-five percent completion (131.75 years) for a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 10. See United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that a 600-
month sentence for a juvenile offender is not proscribed by Supreme Court precedent and within 
the discretionary sentencing power of the District Courts). 
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a purely practical level, without guidance on the proper methodology for 
sentencing, judges across the country may be crafting sentences for juvenile 
offenders that will later become vulnerable to collateral attack—potentially 
clogging the courts with years’ worth of appeals or re-sentencing hearings.  
Public perception of inconsistency within the courts, especially on an issue as 
emotionally charged as placing a juvenile in prison for the remainder of his or 
her lifetime, plants the seeds for claims of overreaching and advantageous use 
of “loopholes,” threatening judicial legitimacy.  In such politically tumultuous 
times as today, the chance to provide clarity and affirm the legitimacy of the 
courts lends itself to the importance of resolving this split. 
This Comment presents a solution to the circuit split based upon concerns of 
practicality and closure of a loophole, arguing for the majority approach.  This 
approach is framed mostly away from a stance of morality and will not try to tug 
at the reader’s heartstrings; rather, this Comment seeks to propose a solution to 
a problem now-existing, grounded in a context of practicality and consistency.  
The Comment will proceed as follows.  Part II will outline the string of decisions 
that gave rise to the distinction between adult and juvenile offenders under the 
Eighth Amendment.  Part III will detail the circuit split and the merits of each 
approach taken by the minority and the majority of the circuits, offering review 
and critique of each.  Part IV will advocate a resolution of the split and suggest 
that the Supreme Court should close the door on de facto life sentences without 
parole, reinforcing its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of the courts below.  
Part V will offer a brief conclusion. 
I.  BOTTOM OF THE EIGHTH: CARVING OUT THE JUVENILE NICHE 
A.  The First Brick in the Wall: Capital Punishment 
The Supreme Court’s first foray into the realm of creating a categorical 
standard for juvenile sentencing under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
unusual punishment clause was during the early 2000s with its decision in Roper 
v. Simmons.11  Up until this point, challenges to sentences of death were 
reviewed on an individual basis under a proportionality test.12  In the 2005 
                                                 
 11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  Simmons was charged with several nonhomicidal and homicidal 
offenses committed while he was a juvenile.  Id. at 557.  “The State charged Simmons with 
burglary, kidnaping, stealing, and murder in the first degree.”  Id.  “The jury recommended the 
death penalty after finding the State had proved each of the three aggravating factors submitted to 
it.  Accepting the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge imposed the death penalty.”  Id. at 558.  
After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that capital 
punishment was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied to the mentally retarded, 
Simmons sought postconviction relief under a theory that Atkins’ rule should be applicable also to 
juveniles due to similar concerns over mental capacity and development.  Id. at 559. 
 12. Mark T. Freeman, Comment, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the 
Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 965 (2013).  Freeman outlines 
this test as follows: 
616 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.3:1 
opinion, drafted by Justice Kennedy, the Court established a categorical ban on 
capital punishment for juveniles, regardless of the underlying criminal charge.13  
Justice Kennedy, including in his opinion reference to various psychological and 
sociological studies on adolescent development, drew out three distinctions 
between juveniles and adults that justified the need for a categorical ban.14  The 
distinctions are as follows: first, juveniles tend to lack maturity and are much 
more prone to reckless behavior than their adult counterparts; second, juveniles 
are more vulnerable to peer pressure and bad influences than adults; third, 
juveniles have not had a sufficient amount of time to develop character.15  These 
are the same distinctions that Court would later go on to cite in the majority 
opinions of both Graham v. Florida16 and Miller v. Alabama.17 
Justice Kennedy was, and in a way remains, the most influential justice in the 
area of juvenile sentencing.  He authored the majority opinions of both Roper 
and Graham and voted in the majority of Miller.18  More importantly, though, 
Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in two of these cases, as well as the only 
conservative Justice to agree with the Court’s reasoning in Graham.19  Justice 
Kennedy’s willingness to step away from the conservative block of the Court on 
this issue gave him the singular power to mold precedent.  He set the groundwork 
in Roper, but Roper was only the first step in a chain of cases that gradually 
curtailed state police power and judicial discretion with regard to juvenile 
sentencing. 
B.  The Wall Gets Higher: Expanding Eighth Amendment Prohibition to 
LWOP 
Rounding out the first decade of the twenty-first century came the Court’s 
next step in differentiating juvenile sentencing requirements under the 
Constitution.  Building off the framework laid by Roper, the Court, in deciding 
Graham, expanded its categorical ban to include not only capital punishment, 
but also “a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not 
commit homicide.  A State . . . if it imposes a sentence of life . . . must provide 
                                                 
First, the Court compares the “gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.”  
Next, if the Court draws an “inference of gross disproportionality,” it compares the 
defendant’s sentence with those sentences “received by other offenders in the same 
jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.”  
Finally, if this comparison “validates an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly 
disproportionate,” the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at 964–965. 
 13. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
 14. Id. at 569–70. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
 17. 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
 18. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 52; Roper, 543 U.S. at 555. 
 19. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 52; Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
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him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release[.]”20  Again relying 
on the distinctions laid out in Roper, the Court found that LWOP sentences for 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders did not mesh with the Eighth Amendment.  In 
addition to these distinctions, however, the Court also was keen to note that, at 
the time of its decision, the United States was the only nation that imposed 
LWOP on juvenile nonhomicide offenders.21  Traditionally, the Court has taken 
global consensus into account when assessing Eighth Amendment questions and 
the Court did so again here.22  The Court noted that the United States was joined 
only by Somalia in its refusal to sign Article 37(a) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which “prohibits the imposition of ‘life 
imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.’”23 
Unwilling to announce a ban on juvenile LWOP altogether, the Court 
restricted its ruling to cover only those juvenile offenders who were convicted 
for nonhomicidal crimes.  There was a clear recognition that juveniles were 
different, at least as far as culpability and sentencing proportionality were 
concerned, but there was trepidation as to where to draw the line.  The Court 
would provide more guidance two years later, this time addressing the issue left 
for a different day in Graham: what to do with those juveniles who were 
convicted of a homicidal crime. 
C.  Where It Stands Today: The Current Last Word on Juvenile LWOP 
The most recent case to which the Supreme Court granted review, which 
addressed the issue of juvenile sentencing and the Eighth Amendment, was 
Miller v. Alabama.24  Drawing on its decisions in Roper and Graham, the Miller 
Court used a two-part approach to extend its Eighth Amendment precedent.25  
“[O]n one hand, Miller relied on existing rationale that juveniles are 
constitutionally different from adults; on the other hand, the Court used adult 
death penalty jurisprudence as a comparative springboard to mandate 
                                                 
 20. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
Graham was 16 when he committed armed burglary and another crime.  Under a plea 
agreement, the Florida trial court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld 
adjudication of guilt.  Subsequently, the trial court found that Graham had violated the 
terms of his probation by committing additional crimes.  The trial court adjudicated 
Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in 
prison for the burglary.  Because Florida has abolished its parole system, the life sentence 
left Graham no possibility of release except executive clemency.  He challenged his 
sentence under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause . . . . 
Id. at 48. 
 21. Id. at 81. 
 22. Id. at 80. 
 23. Id. at 81. 
 24. 567 U.S. at 465. 
 25. Amanda Huston, Comment, Jurisprudence vs. Judicial Practice: Diminishing Miller in 
the Struggle Over Juvenile Sentencing, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 561, 564 (2015). 
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individualized consideration of youthfulness when imposing the harshest 
sentences, such as life without the possibility of parole.”26  The ultimate holding 
of Miller was that juvenile status must be taken into account as a mitigating 
factor when sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, and that mandatory 
sentencing guidelines that require LWOP for such offenders are 
unconstitutional.27  The Court extended its rationale to include not only the 
ultimate sentence handed down by a judge, but also the process followed in 
reaching that sentence and the guidelines to which the judge adhered during said 
process.28 
Miller’s holding was comparatively narrow in scope relative to Roper and 
Graham and did not offer a sweeping categorical ban; however, it did lay the 
groundwork for how courts should interpret disputes over juvenile sentencing in 
general.29  The path that the Court was taking should have become clear.  With 
each decision, the Court was curtailing the severity of sentences meted out to 
juvenile defendants and questioning the legitimacy of one of the harshest 
sentences in the states’ toolbox that was still available for use: LWOP sentences.  
However, the issues left unaddressed by the Court in Miller have caused—and 
continue to cause—disagreement among the federal circuits and the various 
States.30  One area of particular disagreement is in the area of “virtual” or “de 
                                                 
 26. Id. Huston goes on to comment about the broader applicability of Miller’s holding stating, 
  [w]hile Miller’s narrow holding only invalidated mandatory life without parole as 
applied to juveniles, the Court’s broader rationale is applicable in most juvenile 
sentencing hearings.  If juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults, sentencing 
structures must reflect this principle; an offender’s youthful status should be used to 
mitigate on behalf of the juvenile sentence. 
Id. at 564–565 (emphasis added). 
 27. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 28. Id.  The full language of the Court’s holding is as follows: 
  Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge 
or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing 
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.  By requiring that all children convicted of 
homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their 
age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory 
sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
Id. 
 29. Huston, supra note 25, at 564–65. 
 30. See Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De 
Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3439, 3441–42 (2014).  Scavone notes that, 
[S]tate courts have dealt with the question of lengthy term-of-years sentences given to 
both nonhomicide and homicide juveniles that are essentially synonymous with LWOP 
sentences, given the young age of the offenders.  These lengthy term-of-years sentences 
constitute virtual or de facto LWOP sentences that may pose the same constitutional 
questions for juveniles as mandatory LWOP sentences. 
Id.  See also Huston, supra note 25, at 565.  Huston comments that: 
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facto” life sentences—those term-of-years sentences of such a length as to place 
the defendant behind bars beyond the average life expectancy. 
D.  The Dissenters 
The dissenters to the majority rules in Roper, Graham, and Miller have 
remained markedly consistent.  Outside of Justice Robert’s concurrence in the 
judgement in Graham, and save that of Justice Kennedy, the conservative block 
of the Supreme Court has voted against any curtailing of the sentencing power 
of the courts based upon juvenile status.31  The strongest arguments against the 
majority holdings were penned by Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Dissenting in 
Roper, Justice Scalia was quick to point out that the majority relied heavily on 
the global consensus against capital punishment for juvenile offenders.32  Justice 
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, staunchly claimed 
that comparison to international law has no place in American jurisprudence.33  
Weighing heavily on the premise of this Comment is the fact that this staunchest 
of dissenters is no longer available to participate in the debate due to his untimely 
                                                 
  Despite Miller’s broad applicability, courts have found numerous ways to limit the 
application of Miller’s rationale.  In any given case, state and circuit courts will make 
multiple, incremental decisions that appear reasonable in-and-of-themselves, but which 
produce unreasonable, even absurd results in light of Miller’s broad rationale.  The effect 
of this incremental decision making is a slow dilution of Miller’s profound contribution 
to juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.  And the practical outcome of diminishing Miller 
is that post-Miller courts will continue to make juvenile sentencing indistinguishable 
from that of adults. 
Id. 
 31. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 463; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 51 (2010); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551–55 (2005).  Of note is Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham.  There, he 
highlights  the very focus of this comment: “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition 
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito, 
J., dissenting).  However, when making this point, Justice Alito cites to a sentencing term that falls 
outside the respective definition of de facto LWOP.  Id.  He states, “[i]ndeed, petitioner conceded 
at oral argument that a sentence of as much as 40 years without the possibility of parole ‘probably’ 
would be constitutional.”  Id.  Forty years is simply not long enough to implicate a de facto LWOP 
sentence.  Though the number is hard to pin down, life expectancy for a defendant will likely require 
a sentence far longer than forty years to properly implicate de facto LWOP, thereby rendering 
Justice Alito’s point here relatively moot for the purposes of his argument. 
 32. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]undamentally, however, the basic 
premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”).  This dissent attempts to take the legs out from under 
one of the most compelling data points offered by the majority in support of its decision—that the 
United States stands among little company in the international community in terms of the severity 
of punishment meted out upon juveniles, a point upon which Justice Kennedy places much weight.  
Graham, 560 U.S. at 80–81. 
 33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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death in 2016.34  Much can be speculated as to how the Court, with its two new 
members, will address this issue on the next pass.35 
II.  THE DOOR OPENS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT TAKES SHAPE 
In the murky waters left after the Miller decision, a circuit split has developed 
and continues to widen.36  This split is not one within which the sides are playing 
fair—there is a clear majority and minority; however, all it takes is one dissenter 
to form a split and many of the circuits have not yet weighed in on the matter.  
This holds open the potential for further disparity.  The majority “team” consists 
of those circuits that seek to preserve consistency and close the door on the 
loophole that has developed through the use of de facto LWOP, and the minority 
consists of a single hold-out circuit that clings strongly to the rationale of the 
dissent in Miller.37 
A.  Those in Favor: Circuits Advocating Consistency 
The Ninth, Tenth, and the Third Circuits have approached this issue from a 
position of consistency with Supreme Court case law, each arriving at the 
conclusion against de facto LWOP in much the same manner. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit Weighs In 
In Moore v. Biter,38 the Ninth Circuit was the first of the federal circuits to 
approach the question of de facto LWOP as the functional equivalent of LWOP.  
                                                 
 34. Amy Brittain & Sari Horwitz, Texas Sheriff’s Report Reveals More Details on Supreme 
Court Justice Scalia’s Death, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/texas-sheriff-releases-report-on-supreme-court-justice-scalias-death/ 
2016/02/23/8c0bdb0c-da82-11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html?utm_term=.2125259c8f3d. 
 35. See infra Part IV B. 
 36. See infra Part III A, B. 
 37. See infra Part III A, B. 
 38. 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013).  Moore was convicted of sexually assaulting four women 
on four separate occasions.  Id. at 1186.  Of the counts against him, he was found guilty of twenty-
four in total.  Id.  These included: 
[N]ine counts of forcible rape, seven counts of forcible oral copulation, two counts of 
attempted second degree robbery, two counts of second degree robbery, forcible sodomy, 
kidnaping with the specific intent to commit a felony sex offense, genital penetration by 
a foreign object, and the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle.  The jury found that 
Moore also used a firearm while committing his crimes. 
Id.  The California Department of Youth Authority provided the trial court with reports detailing 
Moore’s psychological profile and his potential for rehabilitation: 
One staff psychologist, Dr. Mahoney, found that “there is no reason to believe that 
[Moore] would not continue to be dangerous well into the future.”  The rest of the clinical 
staff, however, concluded that: “[Moore] does not appear to be fixed in his antisocial 
value system as he displays a sense of motivation to change in overcoming his delinquent 
lifestyle.”  A casework specialist found that Moore was “severely depressed with a 
history of impulsivity and some immaturity” and has “expressed a willingness to 
change.” 
2020] Closing the Door on Juvenile De Facto Life Sentences 621 
The case centered around a defendant who was convicted of a multitude of 
nonhomicide crimes committed while age sixteen.39  Upon conviction he was 
sentenced to 254 years and four months in prison.40  Key to the reasoning of the 
Court was that the defendant would not be eligible for parole until he served half 
of his sentence, or 127 years and two months.41  This sentence effectively 
constituted a life sentence without parole, because, as the court noted, 
“[defendant] will spend his life in prison because he would have to live to be 
144 years old to be eligible for parole.”42  The Ninth Circuit’s two-part holding 
is doubly impactful for the purposes of this Comment. 
For the defendant’s sentence—which finalized in 1993— to be attacked using 
the new holding from Graham in 2010, the rule must be held to be retroactive 
and available for use to attack collaterally the prior sentencing practice.43  Not 
all new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are automatically retroactively 
applicable.44  The rules must fit into an exception to be allowed to have 
retroactive effect.45  Rules that categorically ban a punishment for a class of 
defendants fit into this exception.46  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the rule 
announced in Graham did fall under this exception as it: 1) applies to a class 
(juvenile nonhomicide offenders), and 2) categorically prohibits a punishment 
(LWOP).47  It can be fairly said that the rule in Graham is the exact class of rule 
that the Supreme Court had in mind when carving out the above exception.  
Confirming this analysis is the Supreme Court’s holding in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,48 which stated that Miller’s remarkably similar ban on mandatory 
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicidal offenders was a substantive rule of 
constitutional law that has retroactive effect.49  Of import for this Comment is 
the potential retroactive application of a ban on de facto LWOP along the same 
lines as that applied above.50 
                                                 
Id.  The trial court relied on Dr. Mahoney’s report in coming to its sentence.  Id. at 1187. 
 39. Id. at 1186–87. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1187. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1190–91. 
 44. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception 
to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those 
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”). 
 45. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)) (“[A] new rule 
should be applied retroactively if it places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe[.]’”). 
 46. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). 
 47. Id. at 1191. 
 48. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 49. Id. at 736 (“The Court now holds that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional 
law.  The conclusion that Miller states a substantive rule comports with the principles that informed 
Teague.”). 
 50. See infra Part IV A. 
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Having established the legitimacy of Graham’s application to the case before 
it, the court moved on to the more substantive matter of deciding whether the 
defendant’s sentence was “materially indistinguishable” from a LWOP 
sentence.51  The court approached the issue from the perspective of the effect on 
the defendant rather than the label attached to the sentence.52  The court stated 
that “we cannot ignore the reality that a seventeen year-old sentenced to life 
without parole and a seventeen year-old sentenced to 254 years with no 
possibility of parole, have effectively received the same sentence.  Both 
sentences deny the juvenile the chance to return to society.”53  Following this 
reasoning, it cannot be said that any term-of-years sentence, without the 
possibility of parole, that holds a defendant behind bars beyond average life 
expectancy is not, for all intents and purposes, a LWOP sentence.  This approach 
to the issue, if and when it arrives before the Supreme Court, is likely to be one 
of the most effective at achieving the common-sense outcome espoused by this 
Comment. 
2.  The Tenth Circuit Joins the Fray 
The next circuit to accept review of a case concerning de facto LWOP was 
the Tenth Circuit in Budder v. Addison.54  The defendant in Budder was 
convicted of several nonhomicide crimes that were perpetrated while he was a 
juvenile (sixteen years old).55  The defendant’s ultimate sentence, after a 
modification by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, was 155 years.56  Due 
to the functioning of Oklahoma law, the defendant would not be eligible for 
parole until 85% of his sentence had completed, or 131.75 years.57  This 
sentence, while technically falling into the category of life with the possibility 
of parole, was functionally a life sentence; the court, quoting Graham, stated 
that “[t]his sentence means denial of hope . . . . [T]he sentence alters the 
                                                 
 51. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191. 
 52. Id. at 1192. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 55. Id. at 1049.  Budder was convicted of assaulting, both physically and sexually, a 
seventeen-year-old girl.  Id.  The jury found him guilty on four counts: “two counts of first degree 
rape, one count of assault and battery with a deadly weapon, and one count of forcible oral 
sodomy.”  Id.  For his crimes, Budder was given two LWOP sentences, a sentence of life with 
parole eligibility, and a twenty-year sentence to all run consecutively.  Id.  After the decision in 
Graham came down, Budder’s two LWOP sentences were modified to life with parole eligibility 
to accommodate for the new categorical ban against LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  
Id. at 1050.  Pursuant to Oklahoma law, “a prisoner must serve 85% of his sentence before he will 
be eligible for parole.  For purposes of parole, a life sentence is calculated as 45 years.  Thus, 
Budder’s sentences are considered to total 155 years, and he must serve 131.75 years before he will 
be eligible for parole.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 1050. 
 57. Id. 
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offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.  It deprives the convict of the 
most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”58 
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning very closely mirrors that of the Ninth Circuit’s 
above.  Again, the court here calls out the courts below as attempting to rely on 
semantics for justification of their sentencing practices.59  The court put it rather 
bluntly by stating that 
[W]e cannot read the [Supreme] Court’s categorical rule as excluding 
juvenile offenders who will be imprisoned for life with no hope of 
release for nonhomicide crimes merely because the state does not label 
this punishment as “life without parole.”  The Constitution’s 
protections do not depend upon a legislature’s semantic 
classifications.60 
The Tenth Circuit went a step further, though, and identified the possibility of 
an exploitable loophole that must be closed—a proposition that this Comment 
seeks to assert as well.  The court continued, “[l]imiting the Court’s holding by 
this linguistic distinction would allow states to subvert the requirements of the 
Constitution by merely sentencing their offenders to terms of 100 years instead 
of ‘life.’  The Constitution’s protections are not so malleable.”61  Employing 
harsher and more critical language than its counterpart in the Ninth Circuit, the 
court said that “[defendant] received a life sentence [and] . . . [defendant]’s 
sentence does not provide him a realistic opportunity for release; he would be 
required to serve 131.75 years in prison before he would be eligible for parole.  
No fair-minded jurist could disagree with these conclusions.”62 
The court identified de facto LWOP for what it is, an attempt to circumvent 
the decisions of the Supreme Court and avoid constitutional challenges by 
relying on a semantical loophole.  The reasoning behind this approach is sound, 
at least in this author’s mind, and will likely be persuasive when brought before 
the Supreme Court in due time. 
3.  The Newcomer: The Third Circuit 
The most recent circuit to enter the discussion of de facto LWOP was the 
Third Circuit in United States v. Grant.63  The defendant was convicted of 
various nonhomicidal and homicidal crimes committed before he achieved the 
age of eighteen.64  His ultimate sentence was set at sixty-five years without the 
                                                 
 58. Id. at 1056 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 
(2010)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Budder, 851 F.3d at 1056. 
 61. Id.  For further discussion of de facto LWOP sentences as a semantical loophole see infra 
Part IV A, B. 
 62. Id. at 1059 (emphasis added). 
 63. 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018), vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 64. Id. at 135–36.  Grant was convicted of conspiracy and racketeering under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), of various drug related charges, as well as a 
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possibility of parole.65  Given his age at the time of sentencing, the earliest 
possibility for release, with good time credit applied, would have been when the 
defendant was seventy-two, an age that the defendant considered to be 
concurrent with his life expectancy.66 
Much of what the Third Circuit discussed in its opinion was aligned with the 
reasoning of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits; however, the court took a detour when 
considering what is meant by “meaningful opportunity for release” and how to 
determine what is truly “meaningful” in terms of release as relative to life 
expectancy.67  Before addressing this detour, it is important to note that the court 
in Grant unquestioningly confirmed the reasoning of the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, even going as far as to call out the Eighth Circuit as the only holdout.68  
The Court stated: 
 The weight of authority supports our conclusion that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders 
that are not incorrigible.  Here, the District Court found that 
[defendant] is capable of reform . . . . Under Miller and our holding 
today, the District Court’s finding therefore categorically forecloses a 
sentence of LWOP, whether de jure or de facto, and requires the 
District Court to sentence . . . in a manner that allows for some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.69 
The court did not limit its holding to these issues, though.  Choosing to dive 
deeper into the requirement for meaningful release, the Third Circuit read into 
the Graham and Miller conglomerate an additional consideration that builds off 
the idea of life expectancy.70  The Third Circuit currently stands alone in this 
approach. 
The court pointed to the national consensus that retirement should occur at 
age sixty-five.71  This closely mirrors another nationally-recognized line-
                                                 
firearms charge.  Id. at 134.  “The jury returned a partial verdict finding him guilty of the RICO 
conspiracy, racketeering, and drug and gun possession counts (Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 11), and—
as predicates for the racketeering charge—found that he murdered Mario Lee and attempted to 
murder Dion Lee.”  Id. at 136.  Grant was originally sentenced to “LWOP on the two RICO counts, 
a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year 
consecutive term of imprisonment on the gun possession count.”  Id.  Due to the decision handed 
down in Miller, which required sentencing to take into account juvenile status, Grant was re-
sentenced as to the two RICO counts, which resulted in his ultimate sentence of sixty-five years 
without parole.  Id. at 137. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 145–47, 149. 
 68. Id. at 145–46. 
 69. Grant, 887 F.3d at 146 (internal quotations omitted). 
 70. Id. at 152. 
 71. Id. at 151–52 (noting that they, “[w]ithout definitively determining the issue, . . . consider 
sixty-five as an adequate approximation of the national age of retirement to date”). 
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drawing exercise discussed above; namely, the acknowledgment of “adulthood” 
at age eighteen.72  With this age in mind, the court imputed an additional 
requirement for sentencing non-incorrigible juvenile offenders within its circuit: 
that these individuals “be afforded an opportunity for release before the national 
age of retirement.”73  This requirement is not to be hard and fast, rather, it is 
categorized by the court as a rebuttable presumption.74  The court noted that the 
rebuttable presumption is unlikely to be rebutted with any frequency.75  This 
retirement age release presumption is by far the most tenuous of the holdings 
espoused by the majority circuits, and will likely not be able to withstand 
scrutiny in the Supreme Court. 
B.  Those Against: The Outlier Circuit Throwing the Wrench 
As of the drafting of this Comment, only one circuit has advocated the 
minority position of differentiation between actual and de facto LWOP 
sentences.  In United States v. Jefferson, the Eight Circuit upheld a sentence of 
600 months (50 years) for a defendant convicted of various nonhomicidal and 
homicidal crimes.76  In the shortest of the opinions so far addressed in this 
Comment, the Court in Jefferson pursued a rather hardline approach to its 
rationale, arguing that because the Miller court did not place a categorical ban 
on LWOP for juvenile homicidal offenders, that the district courts should be free 
to sentence as they please, even if only nominally taking into account the 
mitigating factors of youth when meting out their sentences.77  It is important to 
note that, procedurally in this case, the defendant was re-sentenced—the life 
sentence originally handed down was replaced with the one at issue: a 600 month 
sentence.78  It can easily be understood that the court, in handing down this 
sentence, was aware that the sentence was not changing in actual effect, but 
rather only in name/categorization. 
                                                 
 72. See Determining the Legal Age to Consent to Research, supra note 2. 
 73. Grant, 887 F.3d at 152. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (noting that the court “believe[d] that such instances will be rare and unusual”). 
 76. 816 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2016).  Jefferson was convicted of conspiracy to commit 
as well as the actual commission of various drug related offenses and with various murders.  Id. at 
1017.  “[A] federal jury convicted Jefferson of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine; 
two substantive drug trafficking offenses in 1997; the firebombing murder of five young children 
in February 1994, when Jefferson was sixteen; and the drive-by shooting of a drug debtor and an 
innocent bystander in February 1995, when Jefferson was seventeen.”  Id.  Jefferson was originally 
sentenced to life in prison under mandatory sentencing guidelines, but after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miller, his sentence was vacated, and he was re-sentenced to the 600-month term at 
issue in the instant case.  Id. at 1017–18. 
 77. Id. at 1018–19.  The court specifically notes that “the Supreme Court in Miller did not 
categorically bar discretionary decisions to impose life sentences on juveniles, the Court ruled that 
a sentencing court must make ‘individualized sentencing decisions’ that take into account ‘the 
distinctive attributes of youth’ before it imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile.”  Id. 
at 1019 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 472 (2012)). 
 78. Id. at 1018. 
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By relying on the minutiae and particularities of the Miller opinion and 
allowing the sentence to stand, the Eighth Circuit, here, chose to ignore the 
greater theme that has emerged from recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.  There 
is a very clear movement toward lowering sentencing harshness and accounting 
for, as Justice Kennedy put it, the “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” that 
accompanies youth and actions taken thereby.79  The Eight Circuit places itself 
out in the cold, standing alone against a growing majority that has found and 
implemented the crux of the motivation behind Roper, Graham, and Miller: 
“[I]mposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot 
proceed as though they were not children.”80 
III.  CLOSING THE DOOR: ADVOCATING FOR AN END TO THE DE FACTO LWOP 
LOOPHOLE 
A.  Practically Speaking 
In advocating the majority approach, this Comment seeks to separate the 
emotive from the pragmatic.  While there is much to be said about societal values 
and the horrors that can be conjured up by setting the scene of throwing away 
the key, much can also be said about the genuine, hard-numbers costs and 
burdens that this circuit split is causing, as well as the potential for further costs 
were the minority view to take hold. 
Delving first into the topic of the potential burden on the court system, every 
court that enacts a de facto LWOP sentence is opening the door to the possibility 
of appeal and for further hearings before the court or other state bodies.  Key to 
its decision in Moore, the Ninth Circuit performed a Teague analysis to 
determine whether the rule announced in Graham was retroactively applicable.81  
In order to fall under the Teague exception, as explained by the court in Moore, 
the new substantive constitutional law must apply to a class of defendants and 
place a particular punishment out of reach.82  If one were to imagine that the 
Supreme Court has espoused the majority opinion with regard to de facto LWOP 
and identified it as materially indistinguishable from LWOP for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, one can see that the new rule would fit quite comfortably 
into the Teague framework.  To begin with, as the Court announced in both 
Graham and Miller, the rule would be applicable to a class—namely: juvenile 
nonhomicidal offenders, juvenile homicidal offenders, or both.83  Next, the rule 
                                                 
 79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 80. Miller, 567 U.S. at 461–62. 
 81. Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 82. Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
330 (1989)). 
 83. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a 
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the 
harshest possible penalty for juveniles.  By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive 
lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related 
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would either prohibit the legislature from enacting mandatory sentencing 
guidelines requiring de facto LWOP or remove the availability of those 
sentences from a judge’s discretion, thereby foreclosing a punishment from 
“criminal law-making authority.”84  Having determined that any new rule 
announced with regard to de facto LWOP would be retroactively applicable, it 
is not a leap to imagine the great burden and financial cost that such a rule would 
have in those jurisdictions that have embraced the minority approach. 
Juvenile offenders would (metaphorically) flock in droves to the gates of the 
courts that have handed down now-unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentences.  
Restricting the scope of the argument to the federal system, there is still potential 
for huge costs, both on the private party making the appeal and the government’s 
defense thereof.  While there is no way to pin down an actual number for the 
costs of an appeal in these type of cases, appellate review can give rise to an 
increase in cost.85  This places a burden on the appellant as well as the taxpayer 
who is footing the bill for the cost of the government’s defense of the appeal. 
This is not to mention the strain on the already-overburdened dockets of the 
courts.86  Those jurisdictions that subscribe to the minority approach are opening 
                                                 
characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate 
this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.”) (emphasis added); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding “[t]he 
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who 
did not commit homicide”) (emphasis added). 
 84. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1190 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)). 
 85. Solomon L. Wisenberg, Federal Criminal Appeals, SOLOMAN L. WISENBERG, 
https://www.wisenberglaw.com/White-Collar-Criminal-Defense/Federal-Criminal-Appeals.shtml 
(last visited June 4, 2020).  As this FAQ points out, the costs of a federal criminal appeal are very 
case specific, and the complexity of each case has a large impact on both the amount of time and 
resources required for the appeal.  Id.  There are a few costs that can be expected at the outset, such 
as the filing fee of $455 as well as the transcript which costs, not uncommonly, over $5000.  Id.  
Add to this the cost of retaining counsel and the billable hours and the numbers continue to grow.  
Id. 
 86. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where 
Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.  The author explains the 
current situation in the federal court system as to the surplus of vacancies and the chronic 
overworking that is plaguing many federal judges: 
  For many district and circuit court judges, going to work means doing their job—
plus the jobs of other judges who are supposed to be there, but aren’t.  That’s because 
federal courts are full of vacancies that aren’t being filled by the Senate, and Congress 
hasn’t created new judgeships in many states for decades, despite skyrocketing caseloads. 
  Litigants are waiting years for their civil cases to be heard because criminal cases 
take precedence.  Judges are struggling with burnout.  And many courts are relying on 
semi-retired judges just to stay afloat. 
Id.  The author goes on to explain that the national average caseload for a federal judge is between 
500-600 cases per year; however, there are some districts where the average rises as high as 1000 
per year per judge.  Id.  These numbers are unsustainable now and adding the potential for a huge 
influx of new criminal appeals or re-sentencing hearings is throwing fuel on an already out of 
control blaze. 
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themselves up to the potential of swelling their dockets with new criminal 
matters—matters that could have been settled previously through issuing 
sentences aligned with trending Supreme Court case law—at the expense of their 
civil dockets.87 
The Supreme Court has attempted to quell concerns about this very issue.  In 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, argued that 
retroactive applicability of Miller would not cause an “onerous burden on the 
States.”88  It can be argued, though, that this claim overly minimized the actual 
costs associated with retroactive applicability.  Justice Kennedy suggested that 
the States can remedy the issue “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to 
be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”89  He then cited a 
Wyoming statute that permits juvenile homicide offenders to be eligible for 
parole after twenty-five years as an example.90  Important though is that passing 
of legislation by the states is still a procedure that places costs on the taxpayer.91  
Additionally, what is to prevent a legislature from passing a law that comports 
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, but still puts the prospect of 
release at such a long distance away (say Justice Alito’s chosen forty years) that 
the juvenile offender chooses to appeal anyway?  There is no way to know this 
for certain, but the thought exercise remains relevant. 
From a practical perspective, the minority position adopted by the Eighth 
Circuit carries the risks outlined above, while the majority approach does not.  
In jurisdictions where the judges themselves have determined the functional 
equivalency of de facto and de jure LWOP, state legislatures need not concern 
themselves with new legislation and juvenile offenders have already been 
provided with the hope for meaningful release that drives those in the minority 
jurisdictions to appeal. 
B.  A Consistent and Legitimate Approach 
Today, society in America is perhaps more fractured than it has been for quite 
some time, but this is nothing new to the American people.92  The courts, by 
their very nature, ought to be a bastion of stability among the current turbulent 
                                                 
 87. Id.  The author provides a poignant quote from Judge Morrison England Jr., the chief 
judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California: “What happens is you have 
to keep pushing civil cases further out.  They’ve already been waiting sometimes three to four years 
. . . I get concerned when cases are so old.  Memories are fading; people are no longer around.  It’s 
not serving anyone trying to get justice.”  Id.  Adding to this already astounding backup with 
superfluous cases is serious cause for pause when considering the merits of the minority approach. 
 88. 136 S. Ct. 718, 725, 736 (2016). 
 89. Id. at 736. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Jake Griffin, Why Legislators Rarely Know Cost of Laws They Pass, DAILY HERALD 
(Feb. 8, 2012, 5:31 AM), https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120208/news/702089933/. 
 92. See Joanne B. Freeman, The Violence at the Heart of Our Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/opinion/sunday/violence-politics-congress.html. 
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sea of political animosity.93  Splits in the federal circuits—particularly on issues 
that the average American can readily relate to—pose a great risk to the 
perception of the courts as legitimate, stability-enhancing institutions.  It is not 
untoward to imagine that issues such as life sentences for juveniles, and the 
manner in which they are imposed, are more readily available as a topic to the 
average American than say imprudent behavior of a fiduciary as it relates to loss 
under ERISA to a plan participant.94  Juvenile life sentences feel more tangible 
than the latter. 
The Supreme Court has, for nearly three decades, been marching forward with 
the curtailment of the sentencing power of judges and legislatures as relates to 
juvenile offenders.95  Those courts that have chosen to ignore this development 
and have allowed the usage of de facto LWOP sentences can be argued to be 
detracting from the legitimacy of the courts, at the very least in the eyes of the 
public.  John C. McCoid, II, observed in a 1991 article on the topic of 
inconsistent judgements that “[i]t is sometimes argued that, when inconsistency 
reveals the occurrence of error, that manifestation of fallibility saps public 
confidence in the adjudicatory process and that inconsistency is thus harmful 
simply because of its signal.”96  This “signal” created by error is strengthened 
                                                 
 93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 422, 431–32 (1988).  Judge Easterbrook is keen to point out that more recent decisions by the 
Court in constitutional matters are not as impactful as those that are longstanding, but this does not 
foreclose on their impact entirely.  Id.  He says of these decisions: 
They still have widespread effects on planning.  Take Miranda v. Arizona, which the 
court unanimously reaffirmed a few years ago even though a majority of the sitting 
Justices probably would not have thought the doctrine attractive as a matter of first 
principles.  Miranda has become a structural decision on which other doctrines and 
institutions depend.  For example, to the extent Miranda makes it harder to obtain 
convictions, courts respond by increasing the sentences of those who are convicted, so 
as to keep general deterrence constant.  The higher sentence levels are built into the 
guidelines that control sentencing in federal courts, and into the penalty structures of state 
law.  One could not change Miranda without being prepared to rethink criminal 
sentences. 
Id.  One can hope that this is the approach followed by the Court when it gets its next pass on 
juvenile sentencing reform—while the new Justices may not have agreed with the doctrine had they 
been seated upon first review of the issue, the engraining of the Court’s holding has taken place 
and reaffirming would likely seem to be a necessity at this point in time. 
 94. See generally Brotherston v. Putnam Invs., LLC, 907 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2018).  This case 
is brought up only for use in the hypothetical presented in the body of the text. 
 95. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52–
53, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 838 (1988). 
 96. John C. McCoid, II, Inconsistent Judgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 488 (1991).  
There is an argument to be made that the public is more willing to accept honest mistakes and errors 
than many commentators have espoused in their research, and one such argument is made by 
McCoid in his article.  See id. at 488–91.  However, the basis of McCoid’s claim is that the errors 
were perceived by the public as “honest mistakes” and “failures” with no reference to deliberate 
choice to ignore precedent.  Id. at 488.  This fundamental difference in the type of error and the 
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when the error is not one of mere fallibility, but one of wanton disregard for the 
precedent laid down by the Supreme Court.  Consistency is key to the function 
of our court system.97  McCoid went on to frame the issue in the following way: 
“Like cases should be treated alike: This formula of Aristotle is widely accepted 
as a core element of egalitarian moral and social philosophy . . . . That is, 
consistency prescribes like treatment for successive cases governed by the same 
rule of law or morality.”98  How can it be that the location in which an offender 
was standing while he committed his crimes can be allowed to be the deciding 
factor in whether he will have a chance for release?  This, though, is the current 
reality of the juvenile offender in the federal system and will remain so until this 
circuit split is resolved. 
In resolving this split, the Supreme Court should continue to honor its own 
precedent, but that outcome is nowhere near certain.  Since the last pass at the 
issue of juvenile sentencing in Miller, the composition of the court has changed 
markedly.  Justice Scalia, one of the most ardent dissenters in the juvenile 
sentencing cases referenced in this Comment, has unfortunately passed; his 
vacancy on the Court has been filled by Justice Gorsuch.99  In addition, Justice 
Kennedy, the swing voter on this issue, has retired and been replaced by Justice 
Kavanaugh.100  How these two new Justices will weigh in on this issue cannot 
yet be determined with any certainty, but there are some indications that Justice 
Kavanaugh may follow in the footsteps of his predecessor.101  For the sake of 
consistency and maintaining legitimacy in the public eye, this Comment 
suggests that Justice Kavanaugh do so. 
                                                 
signal that it sends to the public renders McCoid’s analysis about public perception inapplicable to 
the inconsistency created by the circuit split on de facto LWOP sentences. 
 97. This is not to say that every judgement handed down by a trial judge must maintain perfect 
parity in every case for every defendant convicted of the same crime.  Sentencing is a highly 
nuanced practice that considers specific mitigating and aggravating factors, unique to each 
defendant. See John E. Coons, Consistency., 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 87 (1987) (noting, “[t]he appeal 
to the values of individual judges is a reality of advocacy at every level of litigation”).  Rather, the 
type of consistency espoused in this comment is for the overarching theme of the law.  At the heart 
of the issue of this comment is not whether the defendant was sentenced to sixty-five years and 
another to seventy, the focus is that de facto LWOP should be classified as materially 
indistinguishable from de jure LWOP because to fail to do so would provide trial judges with access 
to a loophole—a loophole that opens the door to the type of inconsistency that threatens judicial 
legitimacy.  See id. at 87–88, 92. 
 98. Id. at 59–60. 
 99. Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme 
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-
gorsuch-supremecourt.html. 
 100. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh is Sworn in After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-
supreme-court.html. 
 101. See Rory Little, Judge Kavanaugh’s Record in Criminal Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 27, 
2018, 1:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaughs-record-in-criminal-
cases/.  Of particular interest are Kavanaugh’s stances on federal sentencing guidelines and his 
often “pro-defense” opinions.  Id. 
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As Judge Easterbrook notes in his article on stability in judicial decisions, 
readiness to overrule constitutional cases threatens the very process of 
constitutional change.102  He states that such overruling “reduces the stability of 
governmental institutions, denying the polity the benefit . . . of continuity.  Not 
coincidentally, it saps the drive for change in the constitutional text.  People who 
seek amendment know that the Court may change the rules at any moment, 
making their campaign unnecessary or even counterproductive . . . .”103  
Additionally, such action has far-reaching impact outside of just the 
constitutional context.  For example: 
[I]t does not take much argument to demonstrate that ready alteration 
of constitutional rules makes the effects of statutes and private 
bargains less predictable.  So although I do not quarrel with the 
proposition that the Court ought to inter recent mistakes before they 
do serious damage, I doubt that judges should be any more ready to 
unravel long-standing constitutional doctrines than they should be to 
revise long-standing statutory interpretations.  Indeed, things should 
work the other way.  Precisely because constitutional rules establish 
governmental structures, because they are the framework for all 
political interactions, it ought to be harder to revise them than to 
change statutory rules.  The reasons for making amendment hard apply 
as well to overrulings.104 
It can be argued that such effects will not be lost on Justice Kavanaugh, and this 
author, for one, hopes that they are not. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Rather than turning its back on thirty years of development around juvenile 
sentencing, it is time for the Supreme Court to honor its precedent.  When the 
issue of de facto LWOP presents itself before the Court—either in a juvenile 
homicidal offender or juvenile nonhomicidal offender context—the Court 
should resolve the split in the manner most conducive to consistency and 
legitimacy while also keeping an eye on pragmatic concerns.  The majority 
opinion amongst the circuits—that de facto LWOP is materially 
indistinguishable from de jure LWOP for Eighth Amendment purposes—is 
exactly that.  Each approach has its merits, but the majority circuits have the 
                                                 
 102. Easterbrook, supra note 93, 430–31. 
 103. Id. at 430.  Judge Easterbrook counsels that constitutional overruling relies more on moral 
judgments than on strictly legal analysis.  Id. at 432.  He states, “a constitutional overruling depends 
on moral and prudential judgments more than strictly legal ones.  On the legal side, we can tell that 
a given rule has been eroded, but the erosion usually marks a moral or prudential problem.”  Id.  
The collective morals of the Court, the nation, and the world have spoken on juvenile sentencing, 
and these moral judgments speak against overruling Supreme Court case law espousing the same.  
See infra notes 105, 106, 107. 
 104. Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 431. 
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stronger case.  Theirs is the one that meshes most soundly with national and 
global consensus in juvenile sentencing practice. 
As was noted at the outset, determination of the exact moment of adulthood 
is a guessing game at best.  Many unknowable factors combine to create what 
society would deem an “adult.”  But the Court need not concern itself with this 
form of speculation or line-drawing.  Let it suffice to say that, wherever that line 
ultimately lands, those under the age of eighteen are different and should be 
treated as such under the law.  This notion has been definitively determined by 
the Supreme Court,105 by the American people,106 and by the international 
community.107  For the sake of consistency, for the sake of practicality, in 
keeping with the legitimacy of the courts, now is not the time to undo all that 
has been done before. 
Close the loophole.  Close the door. 
                                                 
 105. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Thompson, 
487 U.S. at 838. 
 106. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67.  The Court here noted that the “clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”  
Id. at 62 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).  The Court concluded that at the 
time Graham was decided, “only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life without parole 
sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders—and most of those do so quite rarely—while 26 
States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government do not impose them despite statutory 
authorization.”  Id. at 64.  Justice Kennedy pointed to these numbers to espouse a national consensus 
against the use of LWOP on juvenile nonhomicidal offenders.  Id. at 64–65. 
 107. Id. at 80.  The Court cited to a study which concluded: “only 11 nations authorize life 
without parole for juvenile offenders under any circumstances; and only 2 of them, the United 
States and Israel, ever impose the punishment in practice. . . .”  Id.  Additionally, the United States 
was an outlier when it came to juvenile LWOP for nonhomicidal offenders.  Id. at 80–81.  The 
Court notes that “even if Israel is counted as allowing life without parole for juvenile offenders, 
that nation does not appear to impose that sentence for nonhomicide crimes; all of the seven Israeli 
prisoners whom commentators have identified as serving life sentences for juvenile crimes were 
convicted of homicide or attempted homicide.”  Id. 
